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Introduction
Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). An investor may be indifferent to the instrument used since both provide the same terminal payoff. Is it possible that over a period of several years one type of hedging could be cheaper than the other? Credit default swaps have been instrumental in the increased trading in it is revealed that at the end of 2011, the gross notional value of outstanding CDS contracts amounted to approximately°26 trillion, with a corresponding net notional value of approximately°2.7 trillion. Single name CDS accounts for almost 60% of the overall credit market in terms of gross notional.
Following the analogy with the constant maturity swap (CMS) contract, another traded credit derivative is the CMCDS. In such a contract, the buyer pays a premium (spread) in exchange for protection. While in a CDS the spread is fixed, in a CMCDS contract the spread is floating and calculated according to an indexing mechanism.
In particular, the spread is set equal to the observed reference CDS spread at each reset date, multiplied by a factor known as the participation rate (PR). The CMCDS instrument allows economic agents to take views on the future shape of the CDS curve.
Moreover, combining a CDS and a CMCDS with the same reference entity leads to the complete elimination of credit default risk for that obligor, allowing investors to isolate spread risk (i.e. the risk of changes in the premium not related to an actual credit event) and to hedge default risk. In addition, CMCDS are useful for protection sellers to hedge against spread widening risk.
One might presume that during the expansion of the market new operators were joining, trades were increasing due to both the increase in the notional as well as in the number of traders. We might thus think that the market was growing and that traders could have different level of information and understanding of the market activity which in turn may lead to the occurrence of trading inefficiencies
1 . An important research issue then is the identification of the credit instrument to use for protection against default risk. If supply and demand conditions lead to an imbalanced market, it would be useful to know whether it is more cost effective to pay a floating premium spread rather than a fixed one. At any point in time, for a given company, buying protection with a fixed premium may lead to different costs than buying protection with a floating premium. Nevertheless, for the entire universe as a whole and for a long period of time, it should not make any difference what type of premium one is using.
Otherwise, there would be a clear inefficiency in the credit market. This situation has already been investigated in interest rate markets. Brooks (2000) showed that for the interest rate swap market in the 1990s it was net profitable to pay floating and receive fixed. His study pointed out to a market anomaly regarding the interest rate swap market which emerged in the 80s and 90s.
The constant maturity credit default swaps work exactly like constant maturity interest rate swaps by resetting the premium every period in line with a reference rate. Upon default, the CDS and CMCDS contracts will offer buyers the same payoff protection. The main difference between the two default swaps is that one requires a fixed rate premium while the other requires a floating rate premium. The calculation of the floating rate premium is more elaborated than the derivation of a fixed rate 1 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
premium for CDS. In addition, the floating rate premium is sensitive to the shape of the credit curve, whether upward trending or inverted or exhibiting humps due to liquidity pressure at some tenor maturities. Hence, in this paper we conjecture that market participants may favor overall one contract style over another when in fact they should be indifferent if the aim is to trade default protection on corporate single names. While this statement may be more credible for trading data before the subprime crisis, mainly due to the meteoric expansion of the CDS market, it is interesting to see if the same conclusion is still valid after the subprime crisis. In a nutshell, we explore the questions whether there are inefficiencies on single name credit markets, whether these inefficiencies existed only prior to the subprime crisis, whether the forward credit default swap rates calculations were biased and what are the possible determinants of the statistical arbitrage opportunities.
In order to investigate possible trading inefficiencies present on credit markets covering single name corporates, we calculate the forward CDS curves for a large database of obligors for which market CDS premia is available. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that takes into consideration the forward credit curves for the entire universe of corporate single names CDS traded in USD. We believe that the credit curves contain more useful information than just the individual rates along the term structure. In particular the shape of the credit curve determines the forward credit default rates and it contains useful information for investment strategies. Consider for example two companies that have identical five year CDS spreads. Suppose that one has a flat credit curve and the other has an upward trending credit curve. Even if an investor buys or sells simultaneously both names, the value of the two contracts will very likely evolve differently over the term of the contract.
Therefore a pair trading strategy combining a CDS with a CMCDS (one long and one short) for the single-name companies may produce significant profit opportunities.
This is because upon default, the pair of CDS and CMCDS contracts will give a net zero payment but before default the net payments may be more one sided across all companies throughout a long period. In this paper, we show that these opportunities existed before the crisis and also after the crisis, but the direction of the trade has changed after the crisis. For identifying the statistical arbitrage opportunities we perform an exhaustive analysis for a large database of corporate companies during The analysis requires bootstrapping the survival probability curve from the market CDS spreads. To this end, we implement both nonparametric (e.g. piecewise constant hazard rates) and parametric (Nelson-Siegel interpolation and a method driven by an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process for the hazard rates) methods and mostly used by investment banks in a real trading environment. By employing these models we hope to minimize any conclusion bias caused by model risk.
On a large universe of obligors, one expects ex ante that there is no difference which contract is used to hedge default risk. Nevertheless, we identify, ex post, the credit market inefficiencies that existed between 2001 and 2006, and between 2008 and 2013 , in terms of the number of obligors, size of profits that could have been made and the timing of the opportunities. The inefficiencies detected are significantly different from zero, before and after the subprime crisis.
A possible explanation of the inefficiencies related to the forward CDS curves identified in this paper could be a bias related to forward curve calculations. To this purpose, we implement recent panel data testing procedures to test for the forward unbiasedness hypothesis and we show that the forward credit default swaps are unbiased estimators of future CDS rates. Subsequently, we identify several important determinants of the differential between CDS and CMCDS spreads. Our results show that statistical arbitrage opportunities that existed before the crisis were mainly driven by changes in firm-specific volatility, GDP, 10-year treasury rate and to a lesser extent investor sentiment index. After the crisis, the important determinants of trading inefficiencies were changes in firm-specific volatility, in the volatility index VIX, in the investor sentiment index and in the equity index.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the linkages with previous works in credit risk and investments area. In Section 3 we review the pricing methodology of CDS and CMCDS contracts including the convexity adjustment for the latter contract as it was performed by investment banks. The dataset used for calibration and some examples illustrating some numerical issues are shown in Section 4. The results of the statistical arbitrage analysis based on a type of buy and hold trading (static) strategy and also on a dynamic day by day investment are reported in Section 5. In Section 6 we test the forward unbiasedness hypothesis while in Section 7 we analyse the determinants of the significant differences between CDS and CMCDS premia. Section 8 concludes.
Connection with Credit Risk Literature
One stream of the literature on CDS has focused on issues like the validity of the theoretical equivalence of CDS prices and credit bond spreads and the determinants of credit default swap changes 2 . Duffie (1999) and Hull & White (2000) point out that the credit default swap spread for a corporate should be very close to the spread of a par yield bond issued by the reference entity over the par yield risk-free rate to avoid arbitrage between the cash and the synthetic markets. The validity of the theoretical equivalence of CDS spreads and bond yield spreads is tested in Blanco et al. (2005) .
Using a dataset of 33 U.S. and European investment-grade firms, the authors find that the parity relation holds on average over time for most companies, implying that the bond and CDS markets may price credit risk equally. Deviations from parity are found only for three European firms, for which CDS prices are substantially higher than credit spreads for long periods of time. These cases are attributed to a combination of imperfections in the contract specification of CDS and measurement errors in computing the credit spread. For all the other companies they find only short-lived deviations from parity in the sample.
The CMCDS contract requires the reconstruction of the forward CDS curve. The evolution and calibration of these curves for the entire universe of corporate obligors can be decided from the models used by the major banks in the period of investigation. The CMCDS contract is the mirror image in credit markets of the CMS used in interest rate markets. Its main appeal is that it allows one to take views on the shape of the forward CDS curves. Evidence that there exists an over-the-counter CMCDS market is provided by the literature in this area, see Berd (2003) , Calamaro & Nassar (2004) , Brigo & Mercurio (2006) , Krekel & Wenzel (2006) , Li (2007) , Jonsson & Schoutens (2009) . There is comprehensive data available on corporate CDS spreads but there is no data available on CMCDS spreads. One possible explanation is that the CMCDS contracts embed the forward CDS spread rates and since there has never been a forward CDS or futures CDS contract available on the financial markets, the best banks could do is to us internal models calibrated on the available CDS spread market information in order to price CMCDS. Hence, at this point in time the best the researcher can do is to employ a suite of models used in practice by the investment banks for pricing credit products, and apply those models to derive the implied forward CDS curves for all obligors for which market CDS premia is available. The calculation requires bootstrapping the survival probability curve from the observed CDS quotes. To this end, the piecewise constant hazard rate method, the NelsonSiegel interpolation and a method driven by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process for the hazard rates methods, utilised by the main investment banks, are implemented.
Our work differs from Pan & Singleton (2008) , where the focus is on sovereign credit risk, and from Blanco et al. (2005) and Longstaff et al. (2005) , where the comparison is between the synthetic and cash credit markets, in that we investigate arbitrage between two synthetic credit markets for corporates. In addition, our sample of corporate reference entities covers market panel data for approximately 200 obligors for the period before the crisis and 650 obligors for the period after the crisis. The closest to our work is Jarrow et al. (2011) who considered statistical arbitrage in CDS markets in North America based on a reduced-form model of credit risk. The novelty in their paper resides in the affine model estimated for the term structure of CDS spreads of a given company leading to the identification of mis-valued CDS contracts along the credit curve. The model versus market statistical arbitrage is different from the ideas explored in our paper. We look mainly at the inefficiency resulted from trading the shape of forward CDS curves and what are the determinants of the inefficiencies.
Market Models for CDS and CMCDS Pricing
In this section, we describe how premia for CDS and CMCDS contracts are derived.
The survival probabilities are inferred from the market CDS spreads and subsequently used to determine the participation rate driving the CMCDS premium.
The Pricing Framework for CDS and CMCDS
The methodology of CDS valuation described in Hull & White (2000) is applied
here. Consider a CDS contract with periodic premium S(0, T ) to be paid at times s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s N = T or until default, in exchange for a single protection payment to be made at the default time τ , provided that τ ∈ (s 0 , s N ]. Let θ t be the risk neutral default probability density at time t, so that the probability of default in [0, T ] is T 0 θ t dt. The probability that no credit event occurs up to time t is π t = 1 − t 0 θ u du.
Denoting by R the recovery rate upon default, the periodic premium to be paid by the buyer of the CDS when the risk-free rate is constant and equal to r is
where a u is the accrual payment at time u, ∆(s i , s i−1 ) is the time accrual between the market paying coupon times s i−1 and s i , which are quarterly, and DF (u) = exp − u 0 r t dt is the discount factor calculated from deterministic interest rate curve {r t , t ≥ 0} calibrated from market Libor and swap rates. The denominator is the risky PV01, the value of the premium leg assuming a premium of 1 basis point, with the first term indicating the value of a risky annuity and the second term representing the present value of the accrual payments. The numerator is the expected present value under the risk-neutral measure of the payoff received by the protection buyer.
Based on a complete database of UK main listed firms between 1979 and 2009, Bauer & Agarwal (2014) showed that hazard models are superior to alternative models such as accounting-based or contingent claims approach. They showed that there is a clear economic benefit of using a hazard rate model particularly when the performance is judged with return on risk weighted assets computed under Basel III. Hence, in this paper we employ four hazard rate models. For numerical calibration purposes standard practice in the industry was to approximate the integrals in (1). We assume that the default intensity is driven by a hazard rate λ, which can be either constant or stochastic. Let us assume a monthly grid {u j : j non negative integer} for the time of default, and that the default arrives on average in the middle of the time interval.
Thus, the CDS premium spread is calculated as
where SP (·) is the survival probability and n is time to maturity T in months.
In what follows, we discuss how to derive a CMCDS premium participation rate on single obligors based on the information from CDS markets. Closed-form solutions for constant maturity credit default swaps, as well as credit default swaps and credit default swaptions, are derived also in Krekel & Wenzel (2006) , where a Libor market model with default risk is used. Further developments on CMCDS pricing can be found in Brigo & Mercurio (2006) , Li (2007) and Jonsson & Schoutens (2009) .
The participation rate impacts on the magnitude of the premia that will be paid under the terms of this contract and its size is strongly related to the slope of the CDS curve. A participation rate not exceeding 100%, reflects the fact that the CDS curve is upward sloping. On the other hand the participation rate can be bigger than 100%, indicating a downward slope for the term structure of CDS spreads. To derive the PR, we exploit the fact that the loss leg from a CMCDS is identical to the loss leg from a CDS on the same obligor and same maturity and thus the the fixed payment legs ought to coincide in their NPV. Hence, when the reference CDS has maturity m
where the right hand side term comes from (2). Therefore the formula for PR that is applied for all corporates in our sample is
The major problem with (3) is the evaluation of the expected value of future spreads in the denominator. It is clear that, when spreads evolve in a completely deterministic setting, future realised spreads are completely determined from today's spread curve and thus the expected value equals the corresponding forward spread. However, for high volatility names or long maturities a convexity adjustment is required in addition to the forward CDS spread calculation, as described next.
The Forward CDS Spread and the Convexity Adjustment
A long position in a forward default swap gives a credit protection that is active for a period of time in the future at a premium agreed upon today, but paid only during the active period of the contract. The price for a forward contract for default protection during the time period (t, t + m) can be calculated as in Berd (2003):
where
In practice there is a discrepancy between the realised future rate and the implied forward rate. The difference is attributed mainly to a convexity adjustment. This issue has been investigated in mathematical finance especially in interest rate derivatives pricing (see Pelsser 2003 , Benhamou 2000 , 2002 , Henrard 2005a . It plays an important role for CMCDS pricing as discussed also in Li (2007) and Jonsson & Schoutens (2009) . Our approach for taking into account a convexity adjustment is to use the default intensity described by the following OU process
The choice of an OU process for the hazard rate underpinning a credit derivative calculation is motivated by the fact that this model has been used in a real trading environment by investment banks and it has been also mentioned in the academic literature, see Brigo & Mercurio (2006) , Duffie & Singleton (2003) . Another advantage of employing this process is that calculations can be carried out analytically.
Then, as detailed in Calamaro & Nassar (2004) , one can derive an approximate formula for the expected value of the future spread when the default intensity fol-lows (5), which is different from the forward credit default swap rate F S over the same period. The OU hazard rate with convexity correction gives the formula for the expected future CDS
with
. The second term on the right in (6) is the adjustment term due to convexity correction. Then the PR can be rewritten as
and F S(0, T ) is a weighted average of the forward CDS spreads over the reset dates:
. Now we briefly describe the alternative methods we use to approximate the fair CM-CDS prices that come out of trading over the counter.
Extracting Survival Probability Curves
The schedule of fixed payments is quarterly as this is the dominating market standard for corporate entities. The number of quarters fitting into the pricing time grid until maturity T is equal to k = n 3
, where [x] denotes the integer part of x and n corresponds to the number of months until maturity. It is evident that k = n 3 only if t v = t 0 ≡ 0, that is the settlement of the credit contract (t v ) coincides with a credit market quarterly coupon paying date (t 0 ). The first premium is paid at time t n−3k+3
(which coincides with t 3 when n is a multiple of 3). A cash flow diagram is reported in Figure 1 for both the standard CDS contract and the CMCDS contract referencing the same entity. We take into account when the trading occurs within a month.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
There are four methods (OU process with and without convexity adjustment, piecewise constant hazard rates, Nelson-Siegel interpolation) underpinning our results that are commonly used in practice to infer survival probabilities from CDS market quotes and which are presented next. We refer to Brigo & Mercurio (2006) and O'Kane &
Turnbull (2003), for more technical details.
Fitting the CDS Curve Using an OU Process for the Hazard Rate
With stochastic hazard rates the survival probability up to a time t under the risk-neutral measure is given by SP (t) = E 0 exp − t 0 λ s ds . When the hazard rate follows an OU process as in (5) 
One way to derive this formula is to express the stochastic intensity λ as a function Λ of an affine process X whose dynamics is given by the equation:
whereB is a multidimensional Brownian motion and the drift f (X t ) and the covariance matrix g(X t )g(X t ) ′ have affine dependence on X t (see . It can be shown that, under technical conditions (see Duffie & Singleton 2003) , for any w ∈ R
where the coefficients a(·) and b(·) satisfy generalized Riccati ordinary differential equations. If we assume that the intensity itself is an affine process as in (5), then we can apply (10) with w = 0 and Λ(x) = x and obtain analytically the result in (9).
Note that the condition SP (0) = 1 is automatically satisfied. There are four parameters to calibrate (k, α, σ and λ 0 ). We follow the standard market practice and we estimate the obligor individual parameters by minimising the squared residual error between the model implied and market CDS spreads.
Piecewise Constant Hazard Rates
The survival probabilities can be bootstrapped from (2) when there are sufficient maturities for traded contracts to cover the entire set of time points for which survival probabilities must be calculated. One common approach, feasible also in presence of a small number of maturities, advocated by O' Kane & Turnbull (2003) , is to assume that the hazard rate curve is piecewise constant. Suppose that the CMCDS contract we are interested in is traded at time t v and there are CDS market spreads for the same obligor for maturities
For each maturity expressed in months a numerical searching algorithm is applied 3 1 {A} (x) denotes the indicator function that is equal to one if x ∈ A and zero otherwise.
to determine λ i , i = 1, . . . , M.
Calibration with Nelson-Siegel Interpolation
Another possibility is to consider a deterministic time-varying hazard rate such
The role of function Ψ(t) is to capture any term structure variation. One of the common choices for function Ψ(t) is the Nelson & Siegel (1987) 
This function can generate many different curve shapes. The parameter α 0 is the long term mean of the default intensity. Parameter α 1 is the deviation from the mean, with α 1 > 0 implying a downward sloping intensity and α 1 < 0 implying an upward sloping term structure. In addition, the reversion rate toward the long-term mean is negatively related to α 3 > 0. The parameter α 2 is responsible for generating humps when it is different from zero. Bluhm et al. (2003) argue against using humps as this may lead to overfitting problems. We therefore assume that α 2 = 0 and estimate α 0 , α 1 , α 3 only from CDS spread data using a nonlinear optimization algorithm for a suitable minimization function such as sum of squared errors.
Data Description and Some Examples

Single Name CDS Data
Our dataset consists of daily single-name composite spreads covering the period , 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y, 5y, 7y, 10y, 15y, 20y, 30y downloaded from Markit, the industry standard provider in credit markets. The composite spread is the average spread for a credit contract from price information provided to Markit by its contributors. Markit applies a series of data quality tests to remove unreliable information from the sample set 5 . For each day and for each obligor there is also a recovery rate reported that we use later in our analysis. Additional information like sector, rating and country are reported as well. Only the CDS market spreads related to senior tier of debt have been retained for liquidity reasons.
While some banks may feel that their CDS quotes are truly the market prices, the data from Markit on CDS spreads is the only data that can be viewed as the "market" data. Markit's database has been used in almost all recent research involving credit spreads. Moreover, from an industry point of view, the process of marking to market also implies calibrating the internal models to the credit curves provided by Markit.
Since the CDS prices were followed through according to the quarterly schedule of payments, we have selected only those reference entities for which at least one coupon payment was scheduled in 20 September 2001, for the first sample, and, likewise, all reference entities with at least one coupon payment scheduled on 20 June 2008, for the second sample. We kept in our samples only the names for which there was data for recovery rates and spreads covering the entire calendar of payments until the end of the survey period. A further reduction was due to the elimination of obligors with either low liquidity (only one or two maturities traded) or for which we faced numerical convergence problems again due to sparsity of the data. The final sample consists of 198 companies for the static analysis and 207 names for the dynamic analysis in the first period and 626 and 647, respectively, for the second period.
Reference Rate Yield Data
For our empirical analysis, we also need the calculation of discount rates, at daily frequency and over the entire sample period. While traditionally the government bond yields were the obvious choice, more recently the yield curve build from Libor and swap contracts has been employed as a proxy for the riskless curve. The next best proxy would be the general collateral or repo rates as recommended by Duffie (1999) and Houweling & Vorst (2005) but the maturities for these rates are mainly up to one year.
This does not fit our analysis which needs discounting from much longer maturities.
The discount factor curves are constructed daily from Libor rates with maturities 1 month to 11 months and swap rates with maturities 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y, 5y, 7y, 10y, 20y, 30y. A continuum of discount factors is obtained with log-linear interpolation. The
Data on the USD interest rates and it has been downloaded from Bloomberg.
Arbitrage Evidence in Credit Markets
The main aim of this section is to explore arbitrage opportunities when CDS and CMCDS contracts are two alternative instruments. A market participant should be indifferent to which instrument to use to hedge default risk. We show that the above 
where t 0 is the settlement date, PR t 0 is the participation rate on the day t 0 , and S is the periodic premium of the CDS contract.
For illustration purposes, let us first consider two obligors with liquid CDS curves, namely AT&T and Goldman Sachs Gp Inc. In our analysis, the settlement date is the In what follows, we investigate whether the synthetic credit universe of corporates in our sample is closer to AT&T or to Goldman Sachs.
[ Table 1 
Static Investment Analysis
For all companies in our sample we compute the net cumulative profit/loss ( in the second period. For each company j = 1, 2, . . . , 198 in the first sample and j = 1, 2, . . . , 626 in the second sample, we compute the NCPL as
where t i denotes a payment date, S j (u, u + m) denotes the CDS spread at time u for maturity m and company j, and PR t 0 j is the participation rate for company j at t 0 6 . Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the NCPL calculated using the four methods described in Section 3 for all single name corporates, before and after the subprime crisis. The results indicate that, before the subprime crisis, there were significant trading opportunities in the single name CDS market in US. For the period 2001-2006, on average the NCPL measure of performance is negative, but its distribution is skewed towards the range of negative values. This means that the actual profitable strategy during that time was to trade long CDS and short CMCDS.
[ Table 2 about here.]
6 Following market practice, a cap is applied on the floating payment and the NCPL is derived as
The results obtained in this case do not differ from those calculated using (13). Table 2 for the period 2008-2013 reveal that overall for the entire universe of single name CDS contracts, the paired trading strategy will not produce significant NCPL results generated by a buy and hold strategy. However, this does not mean that there were no names for which the NCPL performance measure was large in absolute value. The average sample values for the NCPL in this second period are not statistically significant. This may be caused by the fact that in the second period the strategy is put in place on the 20 June 2008, just before the Lehman Brothers collapse, that led to great uncertainty short term which was cleared out subsequently by the 20th March 2013. It is still possible that a more dynamic trading strategy to be able to adjust to the flow of information and still identify trading inefficiencies in the credit market system. This is shown shortly below in Section 5.2. Table 3 reports the number of obligors with a positive (negative) NCPL at various threshold for both periods. Before the crisis, for all methods, we observe that there were at least 166 companies with a negative NCPL ranging. The results are consistent across the four methods at different NCPL thresholds. The same conclusion can be drawn for the second period, after the crisis when we also had a bigger sample of obligors, with the only important difference that the direction of the trading inefficiency was the opposite way of the pair trade. The main conclusion so far is that the NCPL measure was mainly negative before the crisis but it has changed to mainly positive after the crisis.
[ Table 3 about here.]
It is rather surprising that much of the statistical arbitrage was in the negative NCPL extreme, when the credit spread curves were narrowing. This finding emphasize the important role played by the shape of the CDS term structure curve, something that has been neglected in the credit risk literature so far. The large possible difference in cumulative realised profit and loss is somehow surprising, given that both trades cover the same risk of default. The CMCDS financial product is not so much sensitive to the levels of the premia but to the shape of the CDS curve or alternatively the survival curve.
[ Table 4 about here.]
[ Table 5 about here.]
In Table 4 we report the average NCPL by sector. For the period before the subprime crisis, the sectors with most statistical arbitrage opportunities were Technology followed by Consumer Goods, Industrials, and Consumer Services. When convexity is taken into account Energy sector also showed viable statistical arbitrage opportunities. For the period after the subprime crisis, the NCPL performance measure
indicates that there is a shift in efficiency, the average NCPL value for most sectors seems to decay. The results cross-classified by rating category and model for hazard default rate, reported in Table 5 , show that before the crisis most trading inefficiencies could be found for companies rated A or BBB, where a negative mean NCPL is reported for all models. After the crisis, there is a clear reversal, with the average NCPL being positive under each model for all rating categories superior to B. However, these results may be influenced by the fact that the NCPL calculations were all calculated on a fixed date in 2008 when the financial markets were still turbulent, there was a lot of discussion that the crisis may contaminate the real economy and therefore credit risk sellers were perhaps more cautious in their valuation of credit default swap contracts.
Dynamic Investment Analysis
In this section, we report the results of the dynamic trading strategy for the CDS and CMCDS contracts, following the paired trades on a daily basis. This is a gener-alization of the static trading strategy in that the same algorithm is applied for many consecutive days. Our sample contains only the obligors for which there is data avail- Each paired trade that starts on any given day within the above period is followed through maturity and the profit and loss is calculated and reported comparatively on an average basis. Table 6 Following the credit market convention, we compute the first term of the summation as follow
to take into account the different behavior of the first coupon.
in both samples are strongly statistically significant for all four models used, except the method using convexity adjustment in the period prior to the crisis. Furthermore, while the inefficiency seems to change direction in the aftermath of the crisis, our analysis also shows that the magnitude of the paired payoff strategy has also increased significantly as revealed in the table by the values under the min and max headings.
The results suggest that overall there was credit statistical arbitrage before but also after the crisis. The magnitude of the ANCPL varies according to the method applied and it seems that the convexity correction could play a an important role.
[ The analysis presented in Table 7 and based on the ANCPL measure confirms the results and behaviour observed for the NCPL measure. In the period before the crisis, the majority of trade opportunities were for negative ANCPL, that is trade long CDS and short CMCDS. However, after the crisis, there were still trading opportunities but in the opposite direction, that is trade the pair short CDS and long CMCDS on the same obligor. Table 8 and Table 9 show the mean ANCPL classified by sector and rating, respectively. For this dynamic strategy approach, before the crisis the majority of the trading opportunities seem to fall in the Consumer Goods sector where the mean ANCPL value across the companies in that sector varied across the models between -656.73 for the OU method and -290.51 for the OU with convexity method. With the exception of Consumer services, in this period, all sectors had a negative ANCPL.
After the crisis the sector with the most profitable opportunities was Financials, followed by Consumer Services and Consumer Goods. This was true for all four models and all mean ANCPL values in that subtable were positive, indicating an important change in the relationship between the CDS and CMCDS spreads. Looking at the mean ANCPL by rating in Table 9 , after the crisis there were limited opportunities for higher rating grades but there were substantial opportunities for the lower credit rated companies. This is not surprising since the turbulence of the sovereign bond crisis in Europe during the period 2008-2013 affected the default premia of many companies and therefore increased the CMCDS spread over time during that period.
Thus, a B rated company for which a pair CDS and CMCDS trade will be initiated in June 2008 will carry the fixed CDS premium for the next five years while the CMCDS spread is reset at each quarter. Then, the differential between the CDS and CMCDS spreads will increase.
[ From the full set of results reported in this section, there is evidence of the existence of inefficiencies between CDS and CMCDS markets that allows statistical arbitrage opportunities. One possible explanation is that investors do not play a lot of attention to the shape of the credit curve for a particular company. If the shape of the credit curve for a single name corporate changes from flat (almost constant) to upward trending, the participation rate determined by formula (7) will change substantially.
The participation rate determines the premium to be paid in the CMCDS contracts and it is a function of the weighted average of the forward CDS spreads over the reset dates. Thus, considering the graph in Figure 1 it becomes clear that even if the five-year CDS spread (so m = 5) stays the same, changes in the shape of the credit curve will impact on the calculations of the participation rate PR. Hence, we suggest that investors should consider not only the current values of a five-year CDS spread, say, with the desired maturity but to look at the entire credit curve that may contain information about the future values of the five-year CDS spread. If, for a particular company, the outlook shows that CDS premia are likely to increase then buying protection with a standard CDS is better. However, if the outlook shows that the future values of five-year CDS spreads are likely to decrease then getting protection with a CMCDS is more efficient. The argument works in reverse for an investor looking to sell credit protection, that is she should sell CMCDS when CDS spreads look to rise and sell CDS when the CDS spreads seem to decline. The failure to get this information into consideration is leading to the statistical arbitrage revealed in our empirical analysis above. It shows the importance of looking at the entire CDS curve and not only at individual maturities such as five-year. This conclusion calls for a further investigation on whether the forward CDS rates are unbiased estimators of future spot CDS rates. If the forward rates are biased, this could explain the statistical arbitrage opportunities identified in this paper. On the other hand, if the forward CDS rates are unbiased then the cause of arbitrage may lie elsewhere. In addition, unbiased estimators will give more confidence to apply our analysis with different data. Hence, in the next section we test the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis.
Testing the Forward Unbiasedness Hypothesis for CDS Rates
The forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis (FRUH) postulates that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the corresponding future spot rate. This hypothesis has been extensively tested for exchange rates (see Liu & Maddala 1992 , Maynard 2003 , Westerlund 2007 , among the others), either by regressing the future spot rate, s t+k , on a constant and the forward rate, f t , or by checking for a unit slope in a regression of the spot return s t+k − s t on the forecasting error, f t − s t , which ought be stationary under the FRUH (see Froot & Frankel 1989 , for instance). An alternative approach could be testing s t+k and f t for cointegration like in Baillie & Bollerslev (1989) and Hai et al. (1997) .
In this paper we adopt the latter approach to a panel data analysis. This is the most appropriate approach given that our study follows a large number of companies over many years at quarterly intervals. This choice is motivated by our aim to study the inefficiencies in the credit default swap market as a whole. Any testing of a clear relationship between actual forward rates and future spot rates should have an explanatory power for the entire single name corporates universe. Aggregating either over time or cross-sectionally may have the effect of biasing our conclusions.
Therefore we test for cointegration as implied by the FRUH and test for stationarity in the resulting panel forecasting errors F j (t i , t i + m|F t i−1 ) − S j (t i , t i + m). The 
whereȳ
∆y it =ȳ t −ȳ t−1 . The vector d t represents the deterministic component. The relevant case for us is d t = 0, equivalent to no intercept and no trend, but for completeness of our econometric analysis we also consider d t = 1 when there is intercept and no trend, and d t = (1, t)
′ with intercept and individual specific time trends. Cross-section dependence is controlled by including the cross-sectional meansȳ t−1 and ∆ȳ t , in (14). The critical values are obtained from Pesaran (2007 , Table II (a)-(c)). We apply the CIPS test statistics when y it represents the realized spreads (S), the forward spreads (F S) and the forecasting error (S − F ).
[ Table 10 about here.]
The results are reported in Table 10 and they indicate overall that both the realized spreads and the calculated forward rates are non-stationary before and after the crisis.
When we look at the panel of forecasting errors, the test leads to a rejection of the null of non-stationarity, with only one exception, the Nelson-Siegel method when both the intercept and a deterministic trend are included in the panel regression (14) before the crisis and for the Nelson-Siegel model with and without intercept and trend after the crisis. This means that, in general, the forward CDS spread calculated using the four methods considered is an unbiased estimator for the future CDS rates before and after the crisis. Hence, the trading inefficiencies cannot be attributed to a bias resulting from forward rates calculations. Notice that we did not report any results for the OU method with convexity adjustment. This is because the same forward default rates are calculated under the OU method and under the OU method with convexity adjustment so the results of the CIPS tests are identical.
The Determinants of the difference between CDS and CMCDS premia
The literature on the determinants of credit spreads has grown over the last decade. We use panel data regression analysis in the same spirit and framework as highlighted in Section 6. First, the following dynamic equation is estimated:
+β 4 * Spread t + β 5 * Spread t−1 + β 6 * ∆IV t + β 7 * ∆IV t−1 + ǫ i,t where ∆IV i,t is the change of firm specific implied volatility (ATM) from a call option maturing in 30 days. Moreover, we also insert cross-sectional means (all terms with bar) of regressors and dependent variable to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data.
Secondly, in a second dynamic regression the cross-sectional mean terms are replaced by a series of macro-variables which in the previous equation were indistin-guishably incorporated into the common factors.
The macro-variables considered are ∆GDP t = change in the U.S. GDP (data is ob- [ The results for equation (15) are presented in Table 11 for the 2001-2006 period and in Table 12 for the 2008-2013 period. Likewise, the results for equation (16) are shown in Table 13 for the period before the crisis and in Table 14 for the period after the crisis. First of all, all models show correct specification and remarkable goodnessof-fit, in both periods. We notice a high degree of persistence in the data generating process for Spread i,t which shows a high autocorrelation coefficient, above 0.8 for all regressions before the crisis and above 0.5 for all regressions after the crisis. Highly significant and positive is also the impact of the implied volatility variable. Table 13 reports the results where cross-sectional means are replaced by macro-variables in order to capture the cross sectional dependence between companies.
There is evidence of a statistical significant negative impact of the changes in GDP on Spreads for the "Piecewise Constant" and "OU" methods, before and after crisis, but this variable is not significant when hazard rates are calculated with the OU convexity. One possible explanation is that GDP provides some kind of overall market driver that could be an information proxy for the convexity correction term.
The negative sign is correct since a decrease in GDP will lead to more turbulent credit markets and an increase in the difference between the CDS spread rate and the CMCDS spread rate. The changes in the 10y Treasury yield have a weak positive statistical significance, for the "Piecewise Constant" and "OU" methods before the crisis, see Table 13 , but they are not significant at all after the crisis as revealed in Table 14 . It is well known that after the crisis interest rates went into a downward spiral movement reaching very low levels that remained like that for long periods.
On contrast, except for the OU method with convexity adjustment, the investor sentiment variable has a statistical significant positive impact before the crisis (Table 13) and a statistical significant negative impact after the crisis (Table 14) . This is an important behavioural characteristic captured by the data we have analysed in this paper. The change in credit markets from over-optimism before the crisis to pessimism after the crisis is well documented in the literature. Table 13 shows that there is no evidence of an influence from the Russell 2000 index or the VIX index before the crisis. This is not surprising given that the volatility is variation is already captured through firm-specific option implied volatility. However, in the period 2008-2013 there is significant negative influence of both stock and volatility index, as illustrated by the results in Table 14 . The Lehman Brothers collapse and the long series of problems in the banking sector, realised losses coming from rogue trading as in the case of UBS and Societe Generale, failure of stress testing exercises conducted in USA and Europe, and so many other potential problems related to capital adequacy ratios and new banking regulation being introduced, all these are strongly reflected in sharp changes in volatility indices, equity indices and sentiment indices that drive the increase in the difference between the current CDS rates and the future average credit default premia quantified by CMCDS rates. This conclusion is true also when calculating hazard rates with the OU method with convexity adjustment, which was not true for the other determinant variables like GDP and Treasury rates.
Therefore, we can conjecture that the impact of macroeconomic variables like GDP and interest rates is equivalent to the convexity adjustment of hazard rates, whereas equity index, implied volatility index and sentiment index are significant drivers of in- investigated why spreads on corporate bonds are so much larger than expected losses from default. They found that systematic factors make very little contribution to spreads, even if higher moments or downside effects are taken into account. Moreover, they reveal that spreads are strongly related to idiosyncratic equity volatility. Our study confirms their conclusion that credit spreads may be large because they include a large risk premium related to investors fears of extreme losses.
[ The OU method with convexity adjustment provides different results than the other three methods but this is as expected since it is more elaborate. The convexity adjustment in essence includes a second order term in the calculation of the hazard rates. Methods that do not have this term are simpler to use but are more exposed to sudden changes in market conditions such as falls in GDP or interest rate reductions by the Fed, so the regression models will allow more macroeconomic variables to provide significant information. Furthermore, for the OU with convexity adjustment method as well, after the crisis, the implied volatility variables are all significant, both the individual ones for single-names under investigation and the index volatility capturing the overall view on the economy. This confirms the recent findings in Wang et al. (2013) that the firm-level volatility has an important explanatory power for credit spreads.
The analysis for the second period confirms to a high degree the results found in the first period analysis but it also reveals some changes in behaviour on this market, with more attention being paid to the implied volatility of the companies under study and of the entire market and also to the changes in sentiment index and less to GDP and interest rates.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presented some innovative trading strategies in corporate credit markets based on forward CDS curves and hence on the shape of the credit spread curve.
Our research unearthed a clear market anomaly across the entire universe of US corporate companies for which CDS contracts were traded over the periods January First, a large database covering the entire universe of market single-name credit default swap premia was employed to produce the corresponding constant maturity credit default prices. Then we paired trades with fixed premia against trades with floating premia, by analogy with interest rate swap markets, and we determined the overall performance of the paired and opposite trading, which should produce net results close to zero in efficient markets.
Our results are presented across four methods known to be used by investment banks for pricing CMCDS, thus avoiding model risk. We measured the size of the statistical arbitrage through a buy and hold type of static strategy and also its dynamic version consisting of investing daily between two market reset dates. The main conclusion is that investors could have taken advantage to sell CDS and buy CMCDS, or in other words received fixed and pay floating before the crisis and do the opposite, after the crisis.
Trading gains were observed during periods when CDS spreads were widening.
However, before the crisis the majority of credit statistical arbitrage identified was in the opposite direction, when credit spreads were shrinking, with most names benefiting from spreads tightening beyond the expected levels implied by the forward curves. The
decrease is beyond what the forward default curves imply, pointing to the conjecture that there was too much liquidity pumped up in the financial system through various channels, well beyond the actual needs of the real economy. The situation was reversed in the second period, after the crisis, when credit spreads were increasing, possibly as a reaction to an increase in implied volatility in equity markets.
We also tested whether the forward CDS spreads, calculated as part of the pricing process for CMCDS, were unbiased estimates of the future spot CDS spreads. Using panel data tests, we failed to reject the unbiasedness hypothesis. Accepting that the forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot rates means that the statistical arbitrage identified cannot be attributed to an estimation bias. 
APPENDIX
Details on Parameter Estimation
OU Process
Given a set of CDS spreads with maturities {t n } n∈T , in order to estimate the vector of parameters θ = (λ 0 , σ, k, α) ′ , we first compute the theoretical CDS premium spread, S(0, t n ; θ) following formula (2) and then solve the optimization problems arg min
subject to the constraints θ > 0, SP ′ (T M ) < 0 where T M is the last maturity (20yr) of the available CDS data and SP
Nelson-Siegel
Given α = (α 0 , α 1 , α 3 ) ′ in the parameter space U α ⊂ R 3 , we solve the minimization problemsα = arg min
where S(0, t n ; α) denotes the theoretical CDS spread maturing at time t n with a
Nelson-Siegel function with parameter α. The optimization should be done under the following constraints which identify U α :
The condition (18) is equivalent to α 0 + α 1 exp − t α 3 ≥ 0 which is obtained by imposing that the function Ψ(t)×t is not increasing. As far as the choice of the function to be minimized, in practice we setα =α unlessf (α) <f (α) orf (α) <f (α). In particular, provided that the number, N , of contracts at some point in time is more than six we attach to each CDS market spread the following weights: Figure 1 : Comparison of premia calculations for CDS and CMCDS contracts referenced by the same obligor. At each quarterly market payment time t 0 , t 3 , t 6 , ... the fixed CDS rate S(t v , t v + T ) is paired with the floating premium given by the product of participation rate P R tv and the realised reference market spot rate S(t 3i , t 3i + m). The actual coupon is calculated by multiplying those rates to the quarter period using the market money count conventions. The time t v shows the day when the trading is realised, which may not coincide with a market scheduled coupon paying day t 0 ; if t v is within one month of t 3 then the first coupon is paid at t 6 , otherwise it is paid at t 3 . Table 3 : Number of obligors with a positive (negative), larger than 250 bps (smaller than −250 bps), larger than 500 bps (smaller than −500 bps) and larger than 1000 bps (smaller than −1000 bps) NCPL by different methods of calculation for 2001-2006 and 2008-2013 . "NS" denotes the Nelson-Siegel interpolation, "Piecewise Constant" the bootstrapping procedure with piecewise constant hazard rates, "OU" and "OU conv" are the methods with the OU process without and with convexity adjustment, respectively. Table 7 : Number of obligors with a positive (negative), larger than 250 bps (smaller than −250 bps), larger than 500 bps (smaller than −500 bps) and larger than 1000 bps (smaller than −1000 bps) ANCPL by different methods of calculation. "NS" denotes the Nelson-Siegel interpolation, "Piecewise Constant" the bootstrapping procedure with piecewise constant hazard rates, "OU" and "OU conv" are the methods with the OU process without and with convexity adjustment, respectively. 
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